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Kenya’s tax system has undergone more or less continual reform over the last twenty years. On 
the policy side, rate schedules have been rationalized and simplified, a new value-added tax 
introduced, and external tariffs brought in line with those of neighboring countries in East Africa. 
At the same time, administrative and institutional reforms have taken place. Most notable among 
these was the creation of the semi-autonomous Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) in 1995, which 
centralized the administration of tax collection. 
Kenya has the trappings of a modern tax system, including, for example, a credit-invoice 
VAT, a PAYE individual income tax with graduated but arguably moderate rates, and a set of 
excise taxes focused on the usual suspects (alcohol, cigarettes, gasoline, etc.). However, with up 
to 70 percent of GDP produced and possibly as much as 75 percent of labor employed in the 
informal sector, the ability of the tax system to raise sufficient revenue with minimal distortions 
is severely circumscribed. In such an environment, raising around one-fifth of GDP in tax 
revenue is likely to impose very large distortionary costs on the economy. Continued reform of 
both the policy instruments and the administrative and enforcement capacity of the tax system is 
therefore imperative. 
The aim of this paper is to provide a broad overview of the Kenyan tax system, the 
reforms that have occurred over the past two decades, and the administrative structures in place. 
To properly assess the distortionary costs of the current tax system, we intend to undertake 
micro-econometric analysis of the effects of the tax reforms pursued by the government, using 
individual-level tax return data when available. We discuss the proposed methodology for this 
subsequent research in the conclusion to this paper. 
 
Tax Reform in Kenya 
 
From independence in 1963 until the early 1980s, public spending in Kenya was financed 
through a somewhat uncoordinated set of taxes and fees inherited from British rule and 
supplemented by foreign aid inflows. 
The oil shock in the early 1970s led to the country’s first significant fiscal crisis, in 
response to which some relatively minor tax reforms were undertaken. Sales taxes were 
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introduced as a means of generating extra revenue, and trade taxes were used in an attempt to 
reduce the ballooning balance of payments deficit. One motivation for the relatively heavy 
reliance on good-specific sales and excise taxes was the belief that the government could “get the 
prices right,” especially through its use of trade taxes in the pursuit of first, import-substitution 
policies and then export-led growth strategies.  
Personal, and to a lesser extent corporate, income taxes were seen as serving primarily 
redistributive roles in the 1970s.iv During the period 1974 through 1985, the tax rates on both 
personal and corporate income were high. v Marginal personal income tax rates ranged from 10 
percent on the first shilling to a top rate of 65 percent. The tax rate applied to income of domestic 
corporations was 45 percent in 1974, while foreign corporations faced a rate of 52 percent. 
Analysts have observed (e.g., Karingi et al. 2004a) that little personal income tax was collected 
in the top brackets of the tax schedule. This could have been due to low labor productivity – few 
people could hope to earn incomes high enough to put them in the top bracket. But it is likely 
that both the absolute size of the top personal income tax rate, and the fact that it was 20 
percentage points higher than the corporate tax rate, contributed to the lack of reported income 
by taxpayers at the top end. 
In the early 1980s, growing budget deficits began to loom. Following the second oil price 
shock, and fueled by uncontrolled public spending, the budget deficit ballooned to average over 
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6% of GDP between 1986 and 1993.vi Perhaps in anticipation of these developments, in 1986 the 
Kenyan government approved the Tax Modernization Programme (TMP) aimed at broadening 
the tax base, and in 1987 it adopted the Budget Rationalization Programme intended to place 
controls on public spending. 
 The primary aim of the TMP was to raise the revenue-to-GDP ratio from 22% in 1986 to 
24% by the mid-1990s, although this target was increased to 28% in 1992 (Muriithi and Moyi 
2003). These targets have so far proved elusive (see below). The intent of the reform was, in 
some respects, similar to that of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the US – the revenue increase 
was to come about through lower tax rates, broader tax bases, and closed loopholes.vii Whether 
Kenya was on the wrong side of the Laffer curve before the TMP began is unclear, although the 
high marginal income tax rates suggest it could have been. 
On the other hand, broadening the tax base and closing loopholes would require bringing 
more individuals and businesses into the tax system, itself a challenge given the administrative 
weakness of the existing tax system. The main organizational change aimed at strengthening 
administrative capacity was the incorporation of the Kenya Revenue Authority in 1995.  
The KRA centralized tax collection activities which had previously been undertaken by 
departments in the Ministry of Finance (Muriithi and Moyi 2003). Over the last ten years, the 
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KRA has adopted internal management reforms aimed at combating corruption among revenue 
officers and improving taxpayer services. 
A number of East African countries have created tax collection authorities over the last 
decade. These institutions are semi-autonomous from government, and act under the supervision 
of a board of directors that includes bureaucrats, possibly a senior representative from the 
ministry of finance, and representatives from the private sector. They are meant to have a certain 
degree of financial and operational independence, for example to allow more flexible 
employment practices than exist in the public service, and as a means of providing insulation 
from unwarranted political influence and corruption. In the end, however, they rely on 
discretionary funding from the Ministry of Finance, so their independence from the government 
is not complete. Of course, the formulation of tax policy is rarely (and should not be) the 
responsibility of the revenue administration but remains a ministry, and government, prerogative. 
 
The Structure of Tax Revenues 
 
Tax revenues grew as a proportion of GDP from around 10 percent in the 1960s to about 20 
percent by the early 1980s (Karingi et al. 2004b). In the years immediately following the 
introduction of the TMP revenues gradually increased, reaching 24.6 percent of GDP 1995-96, 
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after which they stabilized at around 23 percent until the end of the decade (KRA 2005 Annual 
Revenue Performance Report). In 1999-2000 revenues fell below 20 percent of GDP, and this 
decline continued until they reached a low of 17.8 percent of GDP in 2001-02. Since then there 
has been a slow increase to 20 percent of GDP in 2004-05. This evolution is illustrated in Graph 
5.1. 
 
Graph 5.1. Tax Revenue, 1968-2005 
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  Source: Karingi et al. (2004a) and KRA (2005). 
  Note: Figures for 1968-1993 are four-year averages. 
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The share of GDP currently collected in taxes is larger than that in many other sub-
Saharan African countries. Kenya had a per capita GDP of about $360 in 2000 (in current 
dollars), and many people eked out a paltry and miserable existence on less than a dollar a day 
(and continue to do so). The poverty rate by this standard was 22.8 percent in 2000, and 58.3 
percent of the population lived on less than $2 a day.viii  Raising around 20 percent of GDP in 
taxes is either impressive or dangerous, depending on the distortionary costs and the productivity 
and efficiency of public spending. 
The share of the economy that is either informal or untaxable for other reasons is likely 
large. For example, Table 5.1 shows the evolution of the sectoral decomposition of output since 
independence. These data do not translate precisely into measures of easily taxed output, but the 
fact that agriculture currently contributes 25 percent and other services 47 percent suggests a 
large share of output is produced in the informal sector.ix 
 
Table 5.1. Distribution of GDP by Sector 
 1964-73 1974-79 1980-89 1990-95 1996-2000 
Agriculture 36.6 33.2 29.8 26.2 24.5 
Manufacturing 10.0 11.8 12.8 13.6 13.3 
Public Services 14.7 15.3 15.0 15.7 14.8 
Other Services 38.7 39.7 42.4 44.5 47.4 
 
  Source: Karingi et al. (2004a, p.15). 
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Table 5.2 provides a more direct measure of the share of output produced in the informal 
sector, which by 2002 employed nearly three-quarters of the workforce. Of course, labor 
productivity in this sector is likely to be low. Nonetheless, getting 20 percent of GDP out of the 
rest of the economy suggests relatively high tax burdens and distortions thereon. 
 
Table 5.2. Recorded Employment 
(In thousands) 







(percent of total) 
 
Total 
1996 1619 63 2644  (61.1) 4326 
1997 1647 64 2987  (63.6) 4698 
1998 1678 65 3353  (65.8) 5097 
1999 1689 65 3739  (68.1) 5493 
2000 1695 65 4151  (70.2) 5912 
2001 1677 65 4624  (72.6) 6367 
2002 1700 65 5086  (74.2) 6852 
 
Source: Karingi et al. (2004a, p.18). 
 
The broad structure of tax revenues has changed to some extent. Income taxes (including 
taxes on both corporate and personal incomes) accounted for about a third of revenues from the 
late 1970s to the late 1990s, although the share was as high as 44 percent in the early 1970s. 
Reliance on import duties has fallen as the result of a move away from protectionist tariff 
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policies and the integration of East African economies. They accounted for about one-quarter of 
revenues immediately before the TMP, but had reached only 15 percent by the early- and mid-
1990s. Excise taxes, primarily levied on alcohol, tobacco, and petroleum products, offset some of 
this change rising from 10 to 16 percent of revenues over the same period. Finally, VAT 
revenues accounted for 25 percent of taxes by 2001, down from 36 percent in the early 1990s 
when the tax was first introduced. Falling VAT rates during this period can account for some of 
this shift, but evasion and moves into tax-exempt activities could also be at work, as well as 
improvements in corporate income and PAYE tax collections. Before the introduction of VAT, 
the sales tax (which the VAT replaced) had contributed between a quarter and a third of revenues 
from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s. 
A more detailed view of recent developments is shown in Graph 5.2, which shows the 
evolution of the structure of tax revenues since 1995, when the KRA was established. A clear 
feature is the increase in the relative importance of PAYE income tax withheld at source, offset 
by a reduction in the share accounted for by corporate tax revenues. Indeed, in 1995-96 corporate 
tax revenues were 1.8 times PAYE taxes, but by 2004-05, the ratio was only 60 percent. It is 
tempting to attribute this change to a convergence of the top personal income tax rate and the 
corporate tax rate, although one might expect to see such a relationship between corporate tax 
revenues and personal income taxes paid by higher-income individuals who are less likely to in 
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the PAYE group. However, the fact that the share of revenue from the two taxes (PAYE and 
CIT) combined did not change significantly over this period suggests that some of this kind of 
income shifting might have taken place. 
Also from Graph 5.2, it is clear that import duties have fallen in relative importance over 
the ten-year period to 2005. Withholding tax revenues (on interest, dividends, and certain other 
sources of non-wage income) have been steady at between 4 and 5 percent of total taxes, but 
other taxes have increased from about 3 percent in 1995-96 to over 12 percent last year. 
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  Source: Tables 7 and 23, KRA 2005, Statistical Bulletin. 
 
Specific Policy Reform Measures 
 
In this section we discuss the features of the major tax instruments that are currently employed 





In 1989, the government passed legislation to introduce a credit-invoice value-added tax, which 
became effective on January 1, 1990. At this time the concept of tax policy simplicity had not 
firmly taken root in Kenya: the VAT was introduced with a standard rate of 17 percent, but with 
14 other rates (the highest being 210 percent) that made the VAT appear more like a 
differentiated commodity tax regime. This multiplicity of rates was particularly difficult to 
rationalize in light of the fact that excise taxes on specific classes of goods were maintained 
during (and indeed after) the transition and implementation of the VAT. 
The high and wide range of rates is thought to have led to widespread misclassification 
and other methods of tax evasion. In response to these concerns, the number of VAT rates was 
quickly reduced to four by 1993-94, when the top rate was set at 40 percent. Since then, the rates 
have been further lowered, and currently there is just a single standard rate of 16 percent, with 
some sales zero-rated and others exempt. (See Table 5.3.) 
 
Table 5.3. VAT rates in Kenya, 1989-2004 
Year Number of VAT rates Standard rate Highest rate 
1989-90 15 17 210 
1990-91 9 18 150 
1991-92 8 18 100 
1992-93 6 18 50 
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1993-94 4 18 40 
1994-95 4 18 30 
1995-96 4 15 25 
1996-97 3 15 15 
1997-98 3 17 17 
1998-99 4 16 16 
1999-00 4 15 15 
2000-01 4 18 18 
2001-02 4 18 18 
2002-03 4 18 18 
2003-04 3 16 16 
2005-06 1 16 16 
  Source: Karingi et al. (2004b), KRA. 
 
All businesses with annual turnover greater than KSh 3 million are supposed to register 
as VAT taxpayers and submit monthly returns.x  In addition, certain traders and members of 
certain professions are required to register independently of their turnover, but this requirement 
is not well enforced.xi  The number of businesses registered for VAT is currently about 54,000, 
up from 36,000 two years ago. However, only about 30,000 VAT returns were received each 
month in 2004-05, suggesting that many firms are dormant (have fallen below the threshold, but 
have failed to deregister, which itself can be a costly process) or non-compliant. The large, and 
possibly inefficient, increase in the number of registered firms is thought to be due to a number 
of issues, including the requirement that any firm seeking a contract with a government agency 
must be VAT-registered (even if it falls below the threshold, and even if it ends up not winning a 
 13
contract), and the VAT withholding regime, discussed presently. This distribution of VAT 
payers and collections is shown in Table 5.5 in the Appendix. 
In most VAT systems, the seller of a product is required to remit tax on sales. In practice, 
there are a number of ways in which the system can be implemented. First, the seller might base 
the calculation of tax payable on an explicit accounting of value added. Alternatively, the seller 
assesses VAT on gross sales but claims a credit for VAT already paid on inputs. Under both 
these systems, only the net amount of VAT is sent to the tax collection agency. Alternatively, the 
seller may be required to write a check for VAT assessed on gross sales, and claim a refund for 
VAT paid on inputs. 
In Kenya, the responsibility for paying VAT on certain sales rests not only with the seller 
but also with the buyer, a system referred to as VAT withholding.xii VAT withholding was first 
introduced in late 2003 and applied to government agencies that purchased goods and services 
subject to VAT.  There was a concern that the government, through these agencies, was paying 
VAT-inclusive prices to suppliers, who were not necessarily remitting the revenue to the KRA. 
Subsequently other purchasers were brought into the withholding regime, and in 2004-05 there 
were about 2000 so-called VAT withholding agents – purchasers who were required to withhold 
VAT In that year, about 40 percent of VAT revenue was collected from these agents. 
One concern with withholding is that it can provide too strong an incentive for firms to 
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register for the VAT.  Suppliers who fall below the turnover threshold but who sell to 
withholding agents are induced to register in search of refunds on inputs, clogging up the system. 
The effect of withholding (see the Appendix for an illustrative example) is to put some 
businesses, in particular importers of oil, in a more or less permanent net credit position, in 
which they seek VAT refunds from the KRA each month. This, however, has led to compliance 
problems, as those subject to withholding rationally expect delays in receiving refund checks. 
The mentality of the KRA, given its focus on tax collection, is one of revenue maximization, and 
refund payment is low on its list of priorities. This policy is of course self-defeating if 
compliance falls enough. One view among tax administrators is that the VAT-withholding 
system has complicated tax collection and created perverse incentives for tax collectors. The 
implication is that direct improvements in enforcement (on which the withholding system was 
first focused) – e.g., through the auditing of suppliers to government agencies – are preferable. 
The government is currently considering the introduction of a presumptive tax, referred 
to as a Unified Tax System (UTS).xiii  The intention of this policy is to target untaxed business 
income by bringing into the tax net those businesses that neither pay income tax nor are part of 
the VAT system. Included in the latter are businesses which are currently required to register as 
VAT payers but choose (illegally) not to and those which have annual turnover less than the 
existing registration threshold (KSh 3 million). In principle, any business that is not required to 
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register for VAT, and does not choose to do so, should be covered by the presumptive tax. That 
is, the VAT/income tax system and the presumptive tax system are intended to be mutually 
exclusive, although some businesses can choose under which regime to operate. 
It is proposed that the tax, which is yet to be introduced, will be related to gross turnover 
or, where such information is not available, it will be lump-sum. The proposal is that the lump-
sum liabilities will be differentiated geographically and by sector. This two-dimensional 
stratification, along with the turnover component, is likely to add a degree of complexity to what 
is supposed to be an administratively simple tax. 
For those businesses that currently fall under the VAT threshold, there may be some 
incentive to register under the presumptive tax regime, depending on penalties for non-
compliance and the “benefits of formality.” One would expect little participation response, 
however, from those that currently have turnovers above the KSh 3 million VAT threshold but 
choose (illegally) not to register. Indeed, some fear that the presumptive tax could induce 
informality – in this case defined as deregistration for VAT – as it legitimizes opting out of the 
VAT system. 
 
Personal Income Tax 
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Individuals pay taxes on earned income at graduated rates. By administrative necessity, personal 
income tax has traditionally only been levied on formal sector workers. Until 2003, most payers 
of personal income tax did not file a return, but simply had tax withheld at source. The 
requirement to lodge a return is believed by some to have increased compliance costs and 
administrative costs significantly, while having little impact on revenues.xiv 
For example, there are currently about 600,000 individuals who submit an annual income 
tax return, but only 10,000 to 20,000 businesses that (should) withhold PAYE taxes. If many 
individuals had other sources of taxable income, individual returns might be necessary. 
However, only about 2,000 individuals submit returns with non-wage income that adds to 
taxable income. It is likely, although there are no data to confirm this, that many high-income 
individuals simply evade tax payments through non-reporting and choice of compensation 
strategy. Thus, while there is not much revenue collected from the personal income tax in excess 
of PAYE taxes, there could be a considerable amount of potential tax revenue from these 
sources. However, focusing on high-income, and politically well-connected individuals is 
particularly sensitive in Kenya. 
In the late 1980s, personal income tax was levied at eight different marginal rates ranging 
from 10 to 65 percent. The top rate was reduced to 45 percent in 1990, 35 percent in 1996, and 
30 percent in 2000, where it remains today. The current rates are 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30 percent. 
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Each taxpayer is eligible for a (non-refundable) credit known as personal relief, which 
amounts to a little more than the amount of tax that would be payable in the first tax bracket.xv 
Thus, in practice, the tax schedule is equivalent to one with a uniform exemption followed by 
rates ranging from 15 to 30 percent. Karingi et al. (2004b; Table 6) have estimated the maximum 
income an individual could earn before paying any personal income tax for the years 1995 
through 2003. They find that this maximum income increased from 2.3 times to 4.1 times the 
national per capita income over this period. 
Until recently, there were two forms of relief, or credit: a personal relief and a larger 
family relief. Non-married individuals could claim the former, and married men could claim the 
latter. Married men were required to pay tax on their combined household income. Although 
KRA income tax forms are currently divided into “self” and “wife,” the incomes of each are now 
taxed independently and each receives a single personal relief or exemption.xvi 
Self-employment and partnership income is taxed under the same tax schedule as wage 
income. Non-wage incomes, in the form of dividends, interest and certain other incomes, 
including royalties and management, professional, and commission fees, are subject to a final 
withholding tax at source.xvii  These taxes are effectively separate and at specific rates from the 
income tax. Given this arrangement, there seems little reason to require wage earners (most of 
whom have only a limited amount of interest or dividend income) to file formal returns. 
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Capital gains are exempt from the personal income tax in Kenya. Although there are 
arguments against the taxation of capital gains, it appears that the dominant reason for the 
exemption in this case is that one of the primary stores of wealth (and sources of capital gains) is 
real estate, the ownership of which is concentrated in the hands of the political elite. 
Pension contributions up to 30 percent of pensionable salary are deductible against gross 
income, and a credit of 15 percent of the cost of life insurance premiums and education policies 
for family members (capped at KSh 36,000 each) is also available.xviii  Mortgage interest 
payments up to KSh 100,000 (KSh 150,000 effective January 1, 2006) are also deductible. 
During the period of reform, some attempts have been made to introduce a presumptive 
tax in lieu of the income tax to reach the informal sector, in particular agriculture. It is widely 
believed that these efforts have generally failed (Karingi, 2004a). Whether the presumptive tax in 
lieu of the income tax and as a supplement to the VAT will meet with greater success is yet to be 
seen. 
 
Corporate Income Tax 
 
About 40,000 firms are currently registered as Corporate Income Tax payers.xix  Tax rates on 
domestic firms have fallen from 45 percent in the mid-1970s to 30 percent currently. (Tax rates 
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imposed on foreign owned corporations were 52 percent, but have fallen over the last thirty years 
to 32.5 percent now.) 
Corporations that locate in Export Processing Zones, which are found in Nairobi and 
Mombasa, and can show that they produce for export, are granted a generous ten-year corporate 
tax holiday.xx Firms outside the EPZs can deduct twenty percent of the costs of investment in 
(new or second hand) plant and equipment up front (equivalent to a 6 percent investment tax 
credit) and then amortize the remaining cost of the investment following specified depreciation 





Excise taxes are levied on (imported) oil products, as well as consumption of beer and spirits, 
cigarettes, matches, and tobacco. Before the TMP, excise taxes had been levied at specific rates, 
but moderate to high inflation induced a change to an ad valorum basis. Later, in the 1980s, the 
tax regimes were selectively switched back to specific charges in the face of undervaluation by 
traders. 
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Prior to 1990, taxes on cigarettes had provided more than half of non-oil excise tax 
revenues and beer about one-quarter. However coincident with the introduction of the VAT, the 
specific tax on beer was replaced with a 100 percent tax rate, and these shares were effectively 
reversed (Kiringai et al. 2002). 
 
Administrative Structure and Reforms 
 
In this section, we discuss a number of administrative features of the Kenyan tax system, 
including the internal organization of the Kenya Revenue Authority, the auditing and refund 
processes, and penalty provisions. We end the section with a brief description of a tax amnesty 
that was adopted in 2004. 
 
Organization of the KRA 
 
Tax collection responsibilities are divided between two main departments in the Kenya Revenue 
Authority: the Domestic Tax Department (DTD) and the Customs and Excise Department 
(CED). The DTD covers personal and corporate income taxes, withholding tax, VAT on 
domestically produced goods, and some other small taxes. Until mid-2005, the CED was 
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responsible for all excise tax collection (on both domestically-produced goods and imports), all 
trade taxes, and VAT collected on imports. On July 1, 2005, responsibility for domestic excises 
was shifted to the DTD. 
The Authority has seventeen so-called stations, or regional branches. Four of these 
stations are in the capital Nairobi (Nairobi North, South, East, and West) and two are in 
Mombasa, the main port. Although the responsibilities of the Nairobi stations are geographically 
determined, all four offices are located in the same building as the central KRA administration.xxi 
One of the seventeen stations is the Large Taxpayer Office, whose clients are not geographically 
determined (see below). In addition to the stations, there are a number of much smaller 
“satellites” that provide a limited range of services, including taxpayer registration, tax forms, 
and payment facilities with an additional nine satellite offices. 
In 1997-98, the KRA created a Large Taxpayer Office (LTO) to specifically monitor and 
provide services to taxpayers that contribute the bulk of revenues. Fully 70 percent of taxes are 
remitted by around 500 taxpayers, although of course the incidence of these taxes, which 
include, for example, PAYE, VAT, and custom and excise taxes, is much broader. 
The primary eligibility criterion for treatment as a large taxpayer subject to LTO control 
is annual turnover of KSh 1 billion (about US $15 million). In addition, firms in certain lines of 
business, including banks, financial institutions, and finance companies, are subject to inclusion 
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in the LTO regardless of turnover. Finally, government agencies and certain parastatals are also 
included. Currently, there are approximately 300 companies subject to LTO treatment, and these 
contribute roughly 60 percent of revenue. A number of companies that meet the threshold are not 
included (for reasons unknown to the authors), and it is believed that doubling the number of 
taxpayers covered by the LTO would mean this office collected about 70 percent of revenues. 
One internal problem with using a Large Taxpayer Office to focus auditing and taxpayer 
services on high-yield clients is that revenues from these companies are no longer collected 
through the relevant branch office, or station. The transfer of responsibility to the LTO meets 
some resistance from said stations, as they often lose a large fraction of their collections. While 
in principle, this should have no impact on incentives or performance – any explicit or implicit 
incentive schemes for regional branches should be easily corrected for the loss of identifiable 
large revenue earners – the expectation is that loss of such clients portends general loss of 
prestige and influence for the station. 
The auditing strategy of the LTO is to audit about one-third of firms subject to its control 
each year. The coverage rate for medium sized taxpayers is much lower, but a target of about 10 





In principle, the tax system is moving in the direction of self-assessment, whereby individuals 
and firms calculate their tax liability directly and submit returns and payments. Administrative 
assessment, on the other hand, requires that each taxpayer’s liability is calculated by a revenue 
official, using data supplied by the taxpayer. In practice, there is a continuum of systems between 
these two, distinguished by the probability of being audited. Auditing activities have recently 
been streamlined with the merger of the Income and VAT departments under the DTD. This 
consolidation has allowed joint audits of VAT and income taxes, including PAYE taxes that are 
the responsibility of the employer (who is often a VAT payer).xxii  In 2004-05, two thousand 
audits were undertaken, raising KSh 5.5 billion (KRA 2005b). To improve compliance among 
taxpayers, the KRA has developed an audit handbook, and is engaged in continuing taxpayer 
education activities. 
The KRA, the Treasury, and KIPPRAxxiii recently fielded a survey to assess tax 
compliance issues in Kenya. Preliminary results show that 74 percent and 72 percent of 
respondents had been subject to a VAT and (corporate) income tax audit, respectively. Roughly 
one-third and one-quarter of respondents reported being audited annually for VAT and income 
tax purposes. These audit rates appear high, but as participation in the survey was voluntary, they 






It is revealing that while most taxpayers surveyed reported being satisfied with the procedures 
for tax registration and payment, they also assessed the procedures for appeals, exemptions, 
remissions, and refunds as ‘very poor’ and ‘unfair’ (Tax Compliance Study). Typically, at least 
sixty days elapse before a refund is processed, and this delay can be as long as 120 days. All 
refunds, including those for VAT collected on imports, are processed by the DTD.xxiv (The CED 
processes all refunds of import excises and duties.) 
All requests for refunds (e.g., for excess VAT paid) must be audited,xxv which may delay, 
and certainly adds to the cost, of receiving compensation for overpayment of net taxes. A further 
impediment to the speedy refund of excess payments is that such transfers are treated under the 
budget as expenditures, not as negative revenues. This distinction is important in practice 
(although of course not in theory) because it means parliament must pass an appropriation bill 
with funds earmarked for refunding. This leads to backlogs which are intermittently cleared, only 
to start growing again immediately. In addition there appears to be disagreement between the 
KRA and the Treasury over the size of refunds required, which again leads to delays. Refund 
policy should clearly be much more automatic, unless there are serious concerns over fraud that 




Penalties and Interest 
 
Penalties for non- or under-payment of taxes are defined by law, and interest of 2 percent per 
month is charged on tax arrears, calculated starting from the date the tax was due. While it is 
standard practice to punish non-compliance starting on the date the tax was due, long delays 
between the submission of a return and auditing tend to increase interest payments by those who 
are found to have underpaid. The relatively high (2 percent) monthly interest rate provides the 
KRA with little financial incentive to speed up auditing.xxvi 
Some observers have identified a legislative source of inflexibility in the penalty system. 
In particular, penalties for non-payment of VAT, income tax, and customs and excise taxes are 
defined under three separate laws, which are difficult to coordinate and to adjust as changing 
circumstances require. Proposed legislation would integrate the penalty provisions and leave 
them to be implemented through regulations. 
Eighty percent of respondents to the survey above claimed that penalties and interest 
were too high, but this is not surprising. Two things that are not clear from the survey are (a) 
whether the penalties and interest are imposed consistently, or whether tax payments are 
negotiated with revenue officials on a case-by-base basis, and (b) what effects these sanctions 
have on compliance and the choice to enter the formal sector. 
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The physical process of paying any bill in Kenya, where the postal system is notoriously 
unreliable, is costly and protracted, often requiring a personal visit to a far-away office. In light 
of this, the KRA has attempted to facilitate easier payment of taxes. It has opened a cash-
receiving center for income tax payments in a regional center (Eldoret) and has expanded the 
number of points at which annual income tax returns can be collected and submitted. However, 
the process remains exceedingly labor intensive. Even with high unemployment and a low 
shadow wage, the congestion costs imposed by the mechanisms for interacting with the KRA 
must surely be large. 
The situation is somewhat better for customs duties and VAT collections. Taxpayers are 
now required to pay self-assessed taxes directly to a bank, although this can simply push the 




On June 10, 2004, the Minister of Finance announced a tax amnesty that permitted individuals, 
firms, and other corporate bodies to pay previously undeclared taxes or duties by the end of the 
calendar year without penalties or interest. The KRA reports the results of this exercise, as 
shown in Table 5.4. In the table, income tax payments reflect primarily corporate income tax 
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proceeds. It is somewhat difficult to interpret the figures, as the KRA did not report the baseline 
or counterfactual against which the estimates were calculated. Potentially more importantly, it is 
not evident what the dynamic effects of this amnesty will be on future incentives to pay tax in 




Table 5.4. 2004 Tax Amnesty Results 
 Revenue (KSh. billion) Number of Applicants 
Income tax 2.98 2,258 
Customs and Excise 0.32 450 
VAT 1.50 865 
Total 4.80  
 
  Source: KRA 2005, Statistical Bulletin. 
 
 
Conclusions and Directions of Future Research 
 
The fixed costs of running a modern tax collection system, coupled with the informal nature of 
much of economic activity, make it difficult to raise public funds in poor countries. Questions of 
 30
how to efficiently raise more revenue, and how to reduce the administrative and distortionary 
costs of raising existing revenue, are two sides of the same coin. Our descriptive summary of the 
Kenyan tax system above suggests a number of avenues of future research that might yield 
insights into these questions. 
With the recent introduction of mandatory filing of personal income tax returns, the 
Kenya Revenue Authority is amassing a large amount of micro data that could be used to assess 
the incentive effects of taxes on labor supply and taxable income more generally. We see two 
separate avenues of research in this vein. First, we consider focusing on employees who 
traditionally did not file a return (and had PAYE taxes withheld). For these individuals, the 
change in filing requirement has effectively reduced the opportunity cost of claiming certain 
deductions, since previously, any filing costs were avoided by not making such claims. 
Second, an analysis of the behavior of high-income taxpayers is desirable. Such 
individuals, to the extent they have had non-wage income, have been required to file individual 
tax returns since the inception of the KRA in 1995. We envision using the reductions in tax rates 
over this period – the top marginal rate fell from 37.5 percent to 30 percent between 1995 and 
2000 – to estimate the responsiveness of taxable income to those rates, and the associated 
distortionary costs.xxvii  Given the possibility of income shifting – from corporate to personal 
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income – the responsiveness of corporate tax payments would need to be incorporated into this 
analysis. 
Other studies would likely require survey data in addition to information from tax returns. 
For example, understanding the effects of the presumptive tax, if one is introduced, would 
necessarily involve collection of data on the nature and extent of informality. Nor are the 
normative impacts of the policy clear-cut. A revenue maximizing tax collector sees the benefits 
of reducing informality, but not necessarily the compliance costs imposed. More fundamentally, 
while entry into the formal sector is often assumed to benefit businesses by improving their 
access to credit and other financial markets, the extent to which (a) this is true, and (b) informal 
credit markets are crowded out, can only be assessed empirically. 
We have said relatively little in this paper about the distributional impact of the tax 
system in Kenya. Due to the large proportion of individuals in the informal sector, as well as the 
personal relief (exemption) in the personal income tax schedule, the instruments that impose the 
highest direct costs on the poor are no doubt excise taxes and the VAT (despite zero rating and 
exemption of some products under the latter). Quantification of the burden requires more precise 
information on household consumption patterns by income category, as well as assumptions or 
evidence about the incidence of these taxes. We suggest however that an important distributional 
concern is not so much how much tax is paid by the poor (or more generally, what the effect of 
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the tax system is on their welfare), but how little tax is paid by the rich, either due to tax 





Appendix: VAT Withholding 
 
Consider an importer who purchases oil for KSh 100. Ignoring excise and import duties, he pays 
VAT of KSh 16 for a total cost of KSh 116. The shipping agent remits a check for KSh 16 to the 
KRA. Suppose the importer’s value added is KSh 25. Under a typical credit-invoice VAT he 
would sell the oil to a retailer for KSh 145, including KSh 20 (=16% of KSh 125). He would 
either remit a check for KSh 20 to the KRA and seek a refund of 16, or simply remit a check for 
the net amount, KSh 4. This is shown in the top panel of Figure 5.1. 
Under VAT withholding, the importer again purchases the oil for KSh 116, but now sells 
to the retailer for only KSh 125. The shipping agent remits a check for KSh 16 as before, but 
now the retailer pays VAT of KSh 20 (=16% of KSh 125) on its purchase. In practice, the 
importer is liable for VAT of KSh 20, but receives a credit for KSh 20 paid by the retailer, as 
well as a credit of KSh 16 already paid on inputs. Thus the importer has an excess credit of KSh 
16, which he must claim as a refund. This is shown in Figure 5.1. 
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> 250 501 0.9 533,923 1,066 18,375 36.7 61.9
100-250 709 2.2 106,775 151 2,980 4.2 72.0
50-100 840 3.8 58,823 70 1,918 2.3 78.4
10-50 3,690 10.6 80,681 22 3,057 0.8 88.7
5-10 2,343 15.0 16,702 7 827 0.3 91.5
3-5 1,942 18.6 7,521 4 407 0.2 92.9
< 3 43,934 100.0 8,954 0.2 2,112 0.1 100.0
 53,959  813,379 15.1 29,676 0.5 
 
  Source: KRA presentation, IMF-sponsored workshop on tax administration, Kenya 






i Prepared for the Initiative for Policy Dialogue Tax Task Force. Thanks to Roger 
Gordon, Dickson Khainga, Jonah Ogaro, Andrew Okello, and Alice Owuor for providing 
information. 
ii Georgetown Public Policy Institute.  
iii Department of Economics. Currently on leave in Nairobi, Kenya. 
iv The theory of optimal taxation (Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971a, b, Mirrlees 1971), 
including the choice between direct and indirect taxation (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976), 
was of course in its infancy in this period. 
v There is a tendency in Kenya to lump discussion of personal and corporate income taxes 




vi If we are to believe that one-half to three-quarters of GDP is produced in the informal 
sector, then estimates of output and any other quantities as a share thereof need to be 
interpreted with caution. However, as we do not have specific information on the way in 
which GDP is calculated, it is difficult to tell in which direction there is likely to be a 
bias, if any. 
vii Something about the revenue-neutrality of TRA86 – was it? – compared with the 
intention of raising revenue in Kenya. 
viii Per capita income had risen to $480 in current dollars by 2004. These data are from the 
World Bank. 
ix Some agriculture output comes from large tea, coffee, and pineapple plantations, which 
is relatively easily taxed. 
x The government may change the filing requirements of smaller businesses, who would 
file bi-monthly instead. 
xi Even though it is not enforced, many VAT taxpayers do have turnover less than the 
standard threshold, thereby bloating the system that the VAT register. 
xii This terminology is consistent with the requirement that the purchaser of labor services 
be required to pay tax on wages paid under the more familiar income tax withholding. 
xiii There is currently in place a presumptive tax on agriculture, which is a 2 percent tax 
on gross proceeds from sales to agricultural traders (middlemen), available to those who 
opt out of the personal income tax regime. Compliance is very limited, and tax 
collections are virtually zero. 
xiv Individuals submit paper personal income tax returns, which are stored in hard copy by 
the KRA. On the other hand, the KRA stores electronic copies of PAYE returns by 
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employers, but there is no cross-link between employers’ returns and individuals’. In 
particular, the employer returns have no means of identifying which employees have had 
PAYE tax remitted on their behalf. There is some evidence that the PAYE tax is being 
withheld by employers but not remitted to the KRA, a simple case of theft. 
xv In 2004 the relief was KSh 12,672, while the bottom tax rate of 10 percent applied to 
the first KSh 116,160 of income. 
xvi Married women have the option of filing separately. 
xvii The withholding rates are 15 percent on gross interest earnings, 5 percent on qualified 
dividends, and 10 percent on ordinary dividends. 
xviii It is believed that the requirement that all wage earners submit a personal income tax 
return could have led to a loss in revenue to the extent that individuals who were 
previously unaware of the deductibility of certain expenses began to take advantage of 
these preferences. Of course, the reduction in revenue (if any) does not mean that the 
welfare impact of this change in behavior was negative. 
xix It is perhaps striking that there are about twice as many firms registered for CIT as 
there are paying PAYE taxes. One possible explanation for this is that many companies 
are created for reasons other than hiring employees, perhaps simply as investment 
holding companies, or as parent companies that own subsidiaries that in turn hire the 
employees. 
xx There are about seventy firms in the EPZs. They are of course required to withhold and 
remit PAYE taxes during this period. 
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xxi The building that houses these offices, the Times Tower, was constructed specifically 
for the KRA. It is the tallest building in East Africa, and has no tenants other than the 
KRA. 
xxii Prior to the merger, the Income Tax department was organized on a functional basis, 
with separate offices for each department, e.g., taxpayer services, auditing, etc. However, 
multiple tasks in the VAT department were carried out by all individuals, with little 
functional delineation. The new merged department has adopted a functional 
organizational structure. 
xxiii Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis. 
xxiv Refund claims that are certified by accredited  accountants are, according to KRA 
policy, supposedly fast tracked. This effectively outsources part of the verification 
process from the KRA at the taxpayer’s expense – a kind of kind of price discrimination 
across tax payers. This policy is unique to Kenya. 
xxv Similarly businesses are required to submit corporate tax returns accompanied by a set 
of audited accounts. 
xxvi Except to the extent that a shilling in the hand is worth more than 1.02m in the m-
month-old bush. 
xxvii In a recent paper, Auriol and Warlters (2005) use a CGE model to compute the 
marginal cost of public funds for a (large) number of African countries. Our micro-level 
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